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The empirical visibility of land use conflicts: From latent to manifest conflict through law enforcement in a national park in Indonesia



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ABSTRACT

The rich literatures about land use *conflicts* make a valuable contribution by empirically describing the substance of local land use conflicts and through this making those cases accessible for research from multiple science disciplines. Those studies, however, often are descriptive in nature, and have a rather vague theoretical conceptualisation of conflict. We propose a conceptual model of conflicts that is based on political theory and the interests of political actors. It stresses that land use conflicts will rarely be *solved*, but are merely *settled* by policy and eventually its enforcement. Throughout the policy process, however, the conflict of interests will remain, while the empirical visibility of land use conflicts will vary.

This article aims to construct a framework for analysing the empirical visibility of land use conflicts, and to apply it for analysing the empirical visibility of the dispute between the Tallasa community and the national park bureaucracy in South Sulawesi, Indonesia. To test this methodology, we conducted observations and interviews. Since 2004, we have been involved both directly and indirectly with the conflict mediation process for the dispute involving the Tallasa community. The results show that the conflict between people-livelihood interests and conservation interests remains the same over forty years but regulations and visibility changed. The national park did not provide a final resolution, but instead supported both conflicting interests. In latent position, policy for enforcing existing formal regulations did not change implementation and visibility in practice. We also find that policy for enforcing a new formal regulation triggered more conflict visibility. Due to the short period of visibility, the development of regulation during the latent period remains open. We conclude that conflict visibility in political discourse and media has an impact on reformulating formal regulation.

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1. Introduction

There are rich literatures on different land use-related conflicts at local levels (e.g. Hares, 2009; Nie, 2006; most recently Kovács et al., 2016; Riggs et al., 2016; Sun et al., 2016; Kaya and Erol, 2016). Within this research, forest-related land use conflicts are a particularly vivid field of current research (e.g. Dhiaulhaq et al., 2014; de Vries et al., 2015; To et al., 2015; Soltani et al.,

2016; Maryudi et al., 2016; Kaakinen and Lehtinen 2016; Castro and Díaz 2016, Riggs et al., 2016). These literatures make a valuable contribution by empirically describing the substance of local land use conflicts and through this making those cases accessible for research from multiple science disciplines. Those studies, however, often are descriptive in nature, and have a rather vague theoretical conceptualisation of conflict. This includes the notion of land use conflicts being potentially *solved* (e.g. Kaya and Erol, 2016; Kovács et al., 2016). Except for a few authors (e.g. Yasmi et al., 2006, 2013; Edwards and Kleinschmit 2013; Hubo and Krott 2013; To et al., 2015; Soltani et al., 2016; Castro and Díaz 2016) the existing literature contains a very limited number of investigations into different stages of *empirical visibility* of land use conflicts as well as explanatory factors for it. In contrast, we propose a conceptual model of conflicts that is based on political theory and the

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interests of political actors. It stresses that conflicts will rarely be (*re*)solved, but are merely *settled* by public policy and eventually its enforcement. Throughout the policy process the conflict of interests will remain, while the empirical visibility of land use conflicts will vary.

Empirically we examine the heuristic case of a conflict in a national park in Indonesia in order to analyse the dimensions of conflict visibility. Conservation areas in Indonesia are the most restricted areas for community forestry activities (Sahide and Giessen, 2015). Since the New Order, low public participation in designating state forest areas has weakened the central government's ability to control forest conservation (Mappatoba and Birner, 2004). Central government control is the driving factor behind the very high intensity of local conflicts, whereby native communities use the resources of conservation forests (Nurrochmat et al., 2014; Bakker and Moniaga, 2010; Fay and Sirait, 2005). This is in line with Fitzpatrick (2006) and Wollenberg et al. (2006), who found that friction between civil society and the state is typical of forest tenure and land use conflicts in developing countries such as Indonesia.

Two policy tools are important when handling local land use conflicts in Indonesia's conservation forests: 1) MoFor Regulation 56 of 2006, which relates to special zones regulating different options for utilization in national parks, and which provides legal options to communities for using forest resources for their livelihoods (Sahide and Giessen, 2015). 2) MoFor, Regulation 19 of 2007 to allow for public participation in collaboratively managing conservation areas (Mappatoba and Birner, 2004). Non state actors employ the normative bearing of these two policy instruments for raising public attention for their particular conflicts, framing the conflicts in new terms, and for involving additional actors in the process to raise the conflict on political agendas and to broaden support for their positions. All these strategic actions have a great bearing on whether or not a specific land use conflict in question is empirically visible.

However, these policies are hard to enforce due to the complex actions of various bureaucratic actors. The policies are the regulatory instruments most used by the national parks, but their enforcement is ineffective due to ambiguity over their application (Moeliono et al., 2010). The contention involves multiple contradictory interests, which is in line with bureaucratic politics theory in that bureaucracies pursue the organisational interests of survival and expansion (Niskanen, 1971; Krott, 1990; Peters, 2010; Giessen et al., 2014; Giessen, 2011; Giessen et al., 2016).

We identified some technical barriers and policy gaps that have blocked many pre- and post-agreements, which is in line with Mappatoba and Birner (2004), who report that obstacles to policy result in conflict. However, in terms of the scholarship on politics, Sahide and Giessen (2015) found that actors' interests are the driving force behind Indonesia's highly complex, fragmented state forests and the transformation policies of land use areas, including disputes over forest resources in conservation forests. We used conflict of interest utilization on National Park Bantimurung Bulusaraung (NP Babul) as our heuristic case. This heuristic case supposed to provide a narrative on how conflict was steered as latent and manifest by the actors' interest. This latent and manifest will be explored in light of political research, which is rare in forest policy sciences.

Before this theoretical as well as empirical background, we aim to construct a framework for analysing the empirical visibility of land use conflicts, and to apply it for analysing the empirical visibility of the dispute between the Tallasa community and the National Park bureaucracy in Indonesia.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1. The empirical visibility of land use conflicts – an actor-centred approach

Political science literature concentrates on the link between natural resources and weak institutions (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005). Some practical experiments have used this thesis to try to enhance the ability of (state) institutions to systematically manage conflict. In terms of recent experiments, state institutions and bureaucracies have found it difficult to react to conflict in order to satisfy their opponents. This is because bureaucracies have their own political logic. Strengthening the ability of the institution is not enough. Practical, formal, and informal interests that will drive actors' options in treating the conflicts are also required. Bureaucracies believe they have unique formal tasks through which they deliver public services (Niskanen, 1971). They also have various interests, including competing with other bureaucracies for jurisdiction over land, resources, political domains and spheres of influence (Niskanen, 1971; Krott, 1990; Peters, 2010). Bureaucracies have two main goals: 1) To provide public services using a problem-oriented delivery approach, as stated in their mandates; and 2) To pursue the organisational interests of survival and expansion (Giessen et al., 2014; Giessen, 2011; Prabowo et al., 2016). In land use politics, however, bureaucracies have been found to be rather production- or conservation-oriented (Hirsch and Warren, 1998). Conservation-oriented bureaucratic interests must rely on symbolic arguments, and are often strengthened by international land use-related regimes (Sahide et al., 2015). Sahide and Giessen (2015) predict that conservation bureaucracies will use symbolic argumentation, such as international forest regimes' rules and norms, or a complex legal system of conservation rules to deal with the interests of local communities and their supporters. Alternatively, bureaucracies might form alliances with and oppositions to district and provincial governments (Sahide et al., 2016a).

National park bureaucracies in Indonesia are conservation oriented. They face a high level of resistance from local communities living in conservation areas (Mappatoba & Birner, 2004). Under Indonesia's democratic system, these bureaucracies must involve third-party actors when mediating conflicts through an approach that includes multiple stakeholders (Hemmati, 2002; Fisher, 1995). Observing the involvement of state and non-state actors provides important insights that can be used to determine their interests in relation to managing disputes through the lens of bureaucracy.

We developed a framework based on actor-centred analysis (Krott et al., 2014), which assumes actors behave and utilise conflicts based on their interests. Influence and power will be a central part of the analysis in terms of observing how these conservation-oriented bureaucracies, production-oriented bureaucracies and hybrid bureaucracies' function (Sahide and Giessen, 2015).

The actor-centred analysis framework places actors and their interests at the hub of the conflict agenda, whereby actors use their power and influence to gain control of the situation and affect the circumstances. Influence is exerted via information and power (Krott, 1990, 2005). Power is the ability to shape a political agenda according to one's own interests, even when facing resistance from opponents and other actors. Weber (1922) describes it as the 'probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will, despite resistance' (p. 152). Krott et al. (2014) describe the three core elements of power as follows: 1) coercion, which they define as 'altering the behaviour of the subordinate by force'; 2) (dis-)incentives, which involves 'altering the behaviour of the subordinate by means of disadvantages or advantages'; and 3) dominant information, which means 'altering the behaviour of the subordinate by means of unverified information'.

Table 1
three dimensions of the empirical visibility of conflicts.

Definition/substance (S)		Settlement/regulation (R)		Empirical visibility (V)	
0	1	0	1	0	1
No substantial conflict (resources are sufficient and distributed to all actors interested)	Conflict exists: limited land use resources with conflicting interests	There is no regulation; or, regulations exist but have not been implemented; these regulations aggravated the conflict	Regulations were enforced in practice	No conflict was mentioned in discourse	The conflict became visible in a specific discourse (the media, the elite, the public, etc.)

2.2. Measuring the empirical visibility of land use conflicts: a three-dimensional model

We established conflict visibility as our meta-concept; however, we needed to reconfigure this concept into specific dimensions in order to clarify our framework. Edwards and Kleinschmit (2013) provide four dimensions to reconstruct and classify conflicts (which came from empirical findings in cases of European forest policy): 1) the substance of a conflict; 2) its procedure; 3) its relationship to the actors involved; and 4) the discourse surrounding it. Based on our actor-centred (Krott et al., 2014) perspective, we developed three dimensions to empirically measure the visibility of land use conflicts: 1) the conflict's definition (the substance); 2) settling the conflict (the regulatory aspect); and 3) the visibility of the particular discourse surrounding the conflict. The settling of a conflict means that the conflict is regulated by political intervention by political means of information or power (Krott, 2005; p. 7). Finally, visibility means that the conflict is mentioned in a specific discourse. This can be in broader public or specific professional discourses. Table 1 explains the three dimensions and their scores.

2.2.1. Dimension 1: the substance and definition of land use conflicts

We based the definition of conflicts on actors and their interests (Krott, 1990; Peters, 2010). A conflict is defined as 'diverging interests which cannot be fulfilled at the same time under resource scarcity' (Hubo & Krott, 2013; p. 64). This contradicting interests create conflicts, which could be complex given the existence of very fragmented interests (Sahide and Giessen, 2015). Often, conservation values restrict the profitability of forest-land (Hubo and Krott, 2013). Local forest dwellers can avoid the main task of conservation and utilise forest and land resources in order to sustain long-term economic production, whereas conservationists look at the forest mainly as an ecosystem that is worth preserving and ask that limits on profitable use be set (similar to the views of Hubo and Krott, 2013).

One example of contradicting interests happens between conservation-oriented bureaucracies and production-oriented ones (Hirsch & Warren, 1998). They strongly represent opposite positions and informally fight for their specific interests, even if formally the state bureaucracy should be well-coordinated.

2.2.2. Dimension 2: settling and regulating conflicts

The settling conflict dimension generally examines how power is used in regulating conflicts of interest. This power could be coercion, dominant information, or incentives. Contradicting interests create conflicts that only become politically applicable if actors express their conflicting positions in the political arena and carry them through the process of program formulation and implementation (Hubo and Krott, 2013). For this heuristic case, we focused solely on regulatory power, which we divided into regulatory formulation and regulatory implementation. We chose this 'coercion only' to support our framework, which examines how coercion is exercised through regulatory instruments in settling conflict in

relation to policy formulation and enforcement. However, in the future, a further research is still needed to link it with other power elements

We focused on the coercive element of control to investigate how the state pressures and influences people by using its regulatory power. Krott et al. (2014, p. 37) define coercive power as 'altering the behaviour of the subordinate by force' or the threat of force. We investigated coercive power in the context of bureaucratic politics by looking at official responsibilities that introduce formal policies and implement them through enforcement. We adopted the approach of Uszok et al. (2003), whereby policy regulation consists of representation, de-confliction (the process of mitigating a conflict), and enforcement. In this framework, we used only two categories of regulation: 1) **policy formulation** and 2) **policy enforcement**. Policy enforcement is the part of implementation which uses coercion. In regards to conservation bureaucracies such as national parks in Indonesia, policy enforcement has specific strengths due to the ability of park staff to exercise coercive power, which supports clear management and administration in the field.

2.2.3. Dimension 3: the empirical visibility of conflicts in multiple discourses

Empirical, visual evidence of conflicts can be found in specific discourses (Kleinschmit and Krott, 2008; Kleinschmit, 2012); for example, in the media and among experts, the political elite, and the larger public.

We propose that certain conflicts become visible in specific discourses and media but are concurrently invisible in other discourses and media. Conflicts which are mentioned in academic discourse or in the discourse of non-state actors at universities are not always visible in general public discourse. Conflicts at the grassroots level are often completely invisible in the media.

2.2.4. Enforcement as bureaucratic strategy: visibility of conflicts through policy implementation and enforcement

Fundamentally, bureaucratic politics observes the increase of its power. This is one aspect of bureaucratic politics. It is the core that players want to gain power, but at the same time, if one agency wants to grow in the same field, then bureaucratic politics can work even for local conflicts, because it came from bureaucratic political behaviour. For example, in this situation, if there is no enforcement or if they decide not to enforce, then there is no conflict visibility involving non-state actors. Hence, through the lens of state bureaucracy, our analysis recognises and analysis 'non-state actors' and their behaviour. In competition with local people, state bureaucracy is gaining control over areas through administration. We will now make two arguments about choosing enforcement for this research framework, rather than policy implementation.

Firstly, we frame the theory or definition of implementation and enforcement as follows: Policy implementation is the process of transforming previously formulated political decisions into action, including its outcomes. This is done through using policy instruments, such as informational, economic, regulatory, and procedural means (Krott, 2005; Howlett and Ramesh, 2003). Policy enforce-

Table 2
Types of Conflict Visibility.

Alternative (Type of visibility)	S	R	V	Description
I	1	1	1	– There is conflict over limited resources. The implementation of policies has regulated the conflict; nevertheless, it is visible in many discussions. – There are some actors who try to put the conflict on the political agenda.
II	1	1	0	– There is conflict over limited resources; the implementation of policies has regulated the conflict, and it is not mentioned in discourses. – The actors are satisfied with the regulation or have no means to put it on the agenda.
III	1	0	0	– There is conflict over limited resources but there is no effective regulation and no conflicts are visible in any discourse. – This is a hidden conflict were the actors are not able to put it on the agenda.
IV	0	1	1	– There is no substantial conflict over limited resources, but there exists a regulation and the discourse mentioned conflicting arguments. – There exist regulations and an active discourse over a conflict of interest, which has no substance because all interests can be fulfilled.
V	0	0	1	– There is no substantial conflict over limited resources and there exists no regulation, but the discourse mentions conflicting arguments at least in the media or among the elite. – This regulation and discourse would be highly irrational.
VI	0	1	0	– There is no substantial conflict over limited resources, but there exists a regulation and no conflict is visible in any discourse. – Abolishing the regulation might be forgotten after the conflict has vanished.
VII	1	0	1	– There is conflict over limited resources but no regulation is implemented and the conflict is visible in many discourses. – In this case, the policy has not found the right regulation to respond to the vivid conflict.
VIII	0	0	0	– There is no conflict over limited resources and no regulation has been implemented. Moreover, no conflicting discourse is present. – The ideal type of true peace exists in the forest.

ment is a subset of policy implementation relating to regulatory instruments only. It is exercised through regulatory instruments in settling conflict in relation to policy formulation and enforcement. Hence, enforcement is the implementation of regulatory policy instruments.

Secondly, policy implementation requires lower-level bureaucracies (agents) to interpret and internalize policies set by the upper-level of bureaucracy (principals). 'Policy enforcement' seems to imply uniform/linear deliberation of policy outcomes through the administrative process. However, according to Ellermann (2005), in coercive policy fields, the assumptions of differentiating principals (heads of national parks or heads of districts) and agents (staff to enforce), are in fact violated; this is also in line with Brehm and Gates (1997), who note that bureaucrats are inherently more interested in 'working' than 'shirking'. Therefore, the consequences of this through implementation and enforcement are identical due to the merger of the principals (national parks) and their agents in the field (national parks' staff). NP Babul is relatively monolithic as a lower bureaucracy, so to merge implementation and enforcement itself in the case of zonation regulation is the main regulative source of conflict.

In this case, NP Babul as the lower-level bureaucracy in the field has great authority to choose whether they would implement such conservation regulation to 'kick' local community activity from the conservation zone or not, which also means enforcing the policy. This is very different from the situation of production and protection forests in Indonesia, in which the lower bureaucracy is fragmented into provinces, districts, and (now) forest management units. There are some exceptions. A previous study in Indonesia showed that Kutai National Park's bureaucracy manifests as a pluralistic entity in the field; therefore, the park has taken a 'wait and see' approach and not implemented the zonation regulations as there are claims of authority from the Kutai district government and East Kalimantan provincial government (Siburian, 2008). Additionally, Kutai National Park does not have enough staff to manage such a large area of conservation forest. For this park, we can differentiate implementation and enforcement due to the large bureaucratic fragmentation at the unit or site levels. In the case of NP Babul,

Maros district government takes a 'silent' position and focuses their main interest on managing mass tourism in the Bantimurung area.

2.3. Analytical framework of empirical conflict visibility

To understand conflict escalation in detail, we developed a three-dimensional typology to assess its visibility (see Table 2). Our heuristic case was the locus for testing our three-dimensional approach or inductively identifying causal challenges of this new method (George and Bennett, 2005). This dimension measures conflict visibility before the policy was issued or formed, before and after laws were enforced, and after a dispute (Brinkerhoff, 2007). We used actors and their interests to indicate each actor's reaction to his or her opponent's action during the conflict, no matter whether the dispute was latent or manifest for any possible discourse visibility audiences (such as the media, the elite, the public, academia, etc.). Therefore, we divided our concept of visibility into two categories to operationalize the dimensions of conflicts' visibility.

Firstly, **latent conflict** means that the conflict exists in the substance dimension, but does not appear in the visibility one ($V=0$); however, it could exist or not exist in the regulatory dimension. Secondly, **manifest conflict** means that the conflict exists in the substance dimension as well as the visibility one ($V=1$); however, it could either exist or not in the regulatory dimension. Visibility means that the public political discourse on different levels and/or the media discourse on different levels show conflicting arguments and positions on an issue. Based on these three dimensions, eight alternative patterns of visibility can be designed. Table 2 shows the specific settings. Not all settings are rational or plausible, but this provides an empirical structure for how rational forest policy behaves in practice. The explanation of limited rationality is a theoretical challenge as well.

2.4. Hypotheses

As explained in Section 2.1, this paper uses bureaucratic politics theory to build an actor-centred framework in order to shape the visibility of conflict escalation, as well as to clarify which types of

visibility exist. In this section, we break our framework analysis down into the following five hypotheses:

H1: The conflict between people's livelihood and conservation interests can remain unchanged in substance for over 40 years, even if regulations and visibility change during that time. The three dimensions of conflict are not necessarily linked to each other and may develop differently over time. This means the option fits into our model that 40 years of activities in enforcement and visibility do not change the conflict in substance. If this hypothesis is supported by empirical evidence, it shows the inertia of conflicts. It is important to avoid overestimating the claims of policy debates and enforcement activities to solve problems.

H2: Policy for enforcing the existing formal regulations does not always regulate conflicts and change visibility in practice. However, policy for enforcing a new formal regulation has a better chance to trigger effective regulation in enforcement and change visibility. This hypothesis focuses on the coercive means of politics. Coercive means claim on a formal level that they force everybody to follow the regulation; but on an informal level, many coercive means fail if their power source is not sufficient. We argue that the existing means of enforcement often exist not because they are successful, but rather the opposite is the case because they have no effect. Therefore, they are not often debated. New coercive means have a better chance to make a difference.

H3: Visibility in political and media discourses has an impact on reformulating formal regulations. This hypothesis links visibility with the regulatory dimension. It assumes that visibility is a fundamental presupposition of the formulation of regulations. As long as a conflict has no visibility, it remains in the sphere of non-decisions (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963). This means no political pressure to solve the conflict builds up to settle the conflict. Nevertheless, our third dimension can indicate that a conflict exists.

3. Methodology

We observed actors and their interests in the conflict between villagers and the national park bureaucracy. Using bureaucratic politics theory, this methodology helped to assess the friction among villagers and their supporters, as well as various bureaucracies. The methods are described below:

- a. Our main method was participant observation (Atkinson and Hammersley, 1994). Since 2004, we have been directly and indirectly involved in consensus building and conflict mediation. We were part of the mediation team from the Forestry Faculty of Hasanuddin University, as well as the team from RECOFTC. Van Evera (1997) maintains that observation is essential for collecting and verifying empirical findings in the social sciences.¹
- b. We conducted stakeholder interviews from 2007 to 2015 with staff members from different government entities involved in the conflict. These included MoFor, the head of NP Babul, the officer of NP Babul, the head of the Maros District Government, the officer of Maros District's forestry agency, as well as Samangki and Tallasa villagers. The purpose of these interviews was to develop a causal explanation for our findings. We used the interviews to consider and reflect on our hypotheses (Mosley, 2013). Table 3 displays a list of observations and interviews.
- c. We applied Friedrich's (1990) examination of the content of official documents to the policy analysis. The content analysis was based on our observations and interviews with stakeholders. We used the most relevant and current policy documents,

¹ Here, we declared a statement of research limitations due to our own assessment of our activities; as mediators, a type of third-party actor, we must remember that our perspectives are subjective.

such as laws, government statutes, presidential proclamations, ministerial regulations, and regional government decrees. These statements explain the formal tasks and informal interests around the process of de-escalating conflicts and building consensus.

4. Results

4.1. Background of the conflict

Most locations in Tallasa Sub-Village became protected forest areas and were assigned the status of partly protected production forests. The village is directly adjacent to the Karaenta Nature Reserve. In 2004, along with the Karaenta Nature Reserve, the area was designated as NP Babul. On the map, Dusun Tallasa (in the Bahasa Indonesia language, *dusun* means 'sub-village'), which is ± 298.45 ha, used to be part of a protected forest directly next to Gua Pattunuang nature park in the vicinity of NP Babul. In the regional administration, Samangki Village has the most extensive zone in the area of Resort Pattunuang-Karaenta, which is part of NP Babul. Approximately 3661.41 ha, or 49.03% of the total area of Resort Pattunuang-Karaenta, are part of the administrative sector of Samangki Village. Fig. 1 shows the location of Tallasa Sub-Village and Samangki Village in NP Babul.

Before NP Babul was established, the sector it comprises was part of a protected area directly adjacent to Cave Pattunuang nature park. However, the people of Dusun Tallasa claim ownership of the region. They have proof of land ownership on different levels, consisting of an ownership certificate on file, a detailed file of 114/*girik* and an SPPT (a document for paying income taxes).² Community use of documents created by the Dutch, called *rincik*, form the basis of land ownership. Most villagers do not have land certificates; they only have SPPTs, which they assume are legally valid documents. The natural forest in Tallasa Sub-Village is included in the special zones of NP Babul, consisting of 352.62 ha. This is evidenced by the detailed land descriptions from Tallasa's residents, which comprise 302 plots.

4.2. Explaining the actors and their interests

In general, Tallasa Sub-Village has been designated as a definitive boundary of the special zone of NP Babul. Tallasa is one of the main producers of traditional palm sugar in South Sulawesi Province. The local community uses wood as energy to make traditional palm sugar; however, use of this wood goes against fundamental conservation rules (Jusuf et al., 2010). Furthermore, Tallasa, which is a rural community, has a long history of using the forest and living in the conservation area; this is also against the rules. To mediate this struggle and find a solution, a complex set of mediating processes have been carried out in the field since 2008 under the community empowerment program of the Forestry Faculty at Hasanuddin University. Furthermore, RECOFTC³ projects on community forestry occurred in 2008 and 2009 (Supratman and Sahide, 2010; Supratman, 2010).

The Special Zone Policy was issued in 2004, as part of a policy regulation on national parks, to declare the area a definitive boundary. However, the local community did not acknowledge this

² An SPPT does not legally validate a person's ability to exploit the rights of land ownership. However, the local community has been using payment of the annual land tax as proof that they can legally utilise the land.

³ RECOFTC (the Center for People and Forests) is an international organisation in Asia and the Pacific. RECOFTC has a country coordinator in Indonesia, 'with a vision of local communities actively managing forests in Asia and the Pacific to ensure optimal social, economic, and environmental benefits' (source: <http://www.recoftc.org/about-us>).




Fig. 1. Tallasa Sub-Village and other locations involved in the conflict.

declaration, and only sees the definitive boundary as a temporary solution. In addition, a forum for multiple stakeholders, such as a consortium of national parks, is very weak in terms of delivering on the substantial issues of conflict governance. The villagers are

still fighting to get back their territory from the conservation forest and state forest designation. Meanwhile, their focus remains on keeping the territory, which has not yet become part of NP Babul. They are trying to overcome the state bureaucracy, which is con-

ervation oriented. Hence, we will discuss conflict analysis in light of political research, which is rare in forest policy sciences.

4.2.1. Fragmented interests among villagers

Based on our observations and a report by NP Babul (2013), we identified four different kinds of actor from Tallasa Sub-Village:

- Members of Tallasa's traditional society have inhabited the area for many generations. They do not belong to the same group of people who are eager to expand the arable land area because they are satisfied with their large territory. According to NP Babul's officers, the traditional society is not aggressive. The main income for this community is income from civil servant jobs. Not many of its members are aware of the problems of the land they inhabit, or are not very concerned about conflict resolution, which important figures in the village are pursuing (N.P. Babul, 2013). However, based on our interviews with the local community, we found it contradictory that the traditional society is also very concerned about the claims on the land.
- The second type is a class of immigrants who live in the region and the Pangia Sub-Area of Tallasa Sub-Village. This group may continue to extend their land and use it for subsistence purposes. Agricultural activities primarily support the local economy; this is also the situation for the traditional society. Their main income for this group comes from farming and entrepreneurship.
- The third type is a class of immigrants who have arable land but are not living permanently in the territory of Tallasa Sub-Village. They cultivate a perennial plant to support their main economic activities. This group has influence in the vicinity of Tallasa and Pangia, and its members still work in the surrounding areas. Their income comes mainly from individual farming.
- The fourth type comprises the descendants of the region's original people, but they no longer live in Tallasa. In general, they still own or control land in the region because they inherited it from their parents. Since this group conducts economic activities and is settled, the land is not controlled by anyone in particular, and can be managed by another party as part of a revenue sharing system (the first and second types share this situation). This group is educated and understands the legal consequences

of tenure. They are helping the community release the area to honour their parents' memory, their childhoods, and their family members in the village. This group often represents Tallasa villagers in important negotiations with opponents.

The fragmented positions and interests of the internal villagers are mixed; however, they often agree that they want the territory to be released from the state forest area. The Special Zone Policy promises local people that they can still live in the national park as long as they follow several basic rules. For example, they are not allowed to cut down trees. However, villagers often object to such rules at meetings at both the village and district levels of mediation. Considering the fragmented and plural interests of internal villagers, it will be either easy or difficult to find a common concern, depending on the quality of internal actors and whether the interests of mutual opponents can be identified.

4.2.2. The interests of the Maros district government

The Maros District Government formed a task force to mediate the conflict with Tallasa Sub-Village in 2008 and 2010, but there was not enough follow-up. The forestry agency of Maros District argued that the task force is not supported by a formal budget (see Table 3 and Fig. 2 for details).

All political candidates running for Bupati (head of the district) of Maros in 2010 exploited the issue of the contention with Tallasa Sub-Village. They campaigned to resolve the dispute. Some elite villagers were directly involved with the election and openly supported a specific candidate. However, the candidate they chose was not elected. We found that the most recently elected Bupati has not paid enough attention to the conflict.

The Bantimurung Waterfall, a natural tourist attraction, has contributed to the district's revenue (PAD/Pendapatan Asli Daerah), bringing in around IDR 5.5 billion each year (Antara, 2011); around IDR 1 billion has been used to manage NP Babul. The tourist site is partially located in NP Babul, under jurisdiction of the Maros District Government. The Maros District Government rejected the proposal that the park's management fully administer Bantimurung Waterfall. To enter the site, both the District Government and NP Babul provide tickets. This explains the interest of Dis-

Table 3
List of observations and interviews.

Observations	
Observation 1, 2004	The legal process of establishing NP Babul by MoFor
Observation 2, 2007	Tallasa villagers legally ask for their zone to be released from the state forest area or conservation forest via facilitation by the district government
Observation 3, 2008	The <i>Bupati</i> (head of Maros District) uses Decree 337 of 2008 to create a task force for conflict resolution
Observation 4, 2009	Bilateral dialogue between Tallasa villagers and NP Babul officers, facilitated by RECOFTC and Hasanuddin University
Observation 5, 2009	Focus group discussion on managing NP Babul, facilitated by RECOFTC and Hasanuddin University
Observation 6, 2010	The head of the Maros District Government rearranged the composition of the members that make up the task force for conflict resolution
Observation 7, 2010	Using law enforcement, a Tallasa villager was sentenced to one year in prison for illegal mining activities
Observation 8, 2010	Public consultation on drafting the special zone documents that govern the sub-district, including Tallasa Sub-Village
Observation 9, 2010	Workshop on cooperatively managing NP Babul at Hotel Santika Makassar
Observation 10, 2013	Meeting with the local parliament of Maros District
Observation 10, 2013	Workshop on solving conflict in Tallasa Sub-Village, regarding the use of forest resources in a state forest area
Interviews	
Interview 1, 2007	Interview with the head of NP Babul, September 2007
Interview 2, 2010	Interview with the officer of NP Babul, August, September and October 2010
Interview 3, 2010	Interview with the head of Maros District's forestry agency, November 2010
Interview 4, 2010	Interview with the <i>Bupati</i> of Maros District, November 2010
Interview 5, 2010	Interview with the coordinator of the task force, November 2010
Interview 6, 2015	Interview with a parliament member of Maros District, November 2010
Interview 7, 2015	Interview with the first village representative, August 2010
Interview 8, 2015	Interview with the second village representative, August 2010
Interview 9, 2015	Interview with the third village representative, September 2010
Interview 10, 2015	Interview with the fourth village representative, September 2010
Interview 11, 2015	Interview with the fourth village representative, September 2010




Fig. 2. conflict visibility dynamics by Tallasa villagers versus NP Babul.

trict Government in maintaining good relations with NP Babul and in strengthening its position to deal with central bureaucracies. The District Government seems to possess a 'wait and see' attitude when it comes to handling the discord. It only reacts if local villagers pressure it or if third parties intervene. Hence, district bureaucracies only make use of a dispute if they can achieve their own interests (such as political electability for district elections), or raise their status when competing against and collaborating with central conservation bureaucracies.

4.2.3. The interests of NP Babul and the related bureaucracies

Recently, national park bureaucracies formally issued production-oriented goals as part of their official mandates. Under MoFor's Directorate General of Forest Protection and Nature Conservation, national parks are required to increase non-tax revenues—which are around IDR 1 trillion annually—especially from the tourism sector; national parks are also required to reduce social pressure on conservation park management (Insitut Pertanian Bogor, or IPB, 2014). Official documents on MoFor's strategic plan for 2010–2014 reflect this (MoFor, 2009). However, it is very difficult to operationalise this goal due to the very strong, conservation-oriented nature of national park bureaucracies.

In regards to accepting and facilitating the villagers' proposal, it is difficult to release a state forest area from a conservation forest. The status of such a territory must first be changed to a production forest, and then it can be released (Sahide and Giessen, 2015). Furthermore, NP Babul's management has an ambiguous position. If Tallasa Sub-Village succeeds at releasing its territory from the state forest area, then other villages with similar circumstances will make the same demand. People will assume that the park's management failed. However, if Tallasa is not allowed to have their territory released, then NP Babul's management will spend a lot of energy trying to resolve the conflict. Hence, NP Babul hinders the national park bureaucracies from expanding the interpretation of formal mandates to include production and social interests.

Law enforcement, a major tool for implementing conservation, has rendered efforts to empower the community invisible. One of the NP Babul strategies for reducing escalation is enhancing the community empowerment program. However, this program is meant for the villages neighbouring Tallasa (such as Labuaja Village), and some villages are not located in NP Babul or are excluded from it (such as Patanyamang Village). This has caused outsiders to become jealous of Tallasa residents. That is why Tallasa villagers are not involved in a vast conflict, and NP Babul's management

supports the idea of mitigating tensions. In carrying out the community empowerment program in Patanyamang Village, NP Babul uses the outside villagers as a buffer zone. Labuaja villagers receive support from the empowerment program because they have made better progress in terms of traditional sectors. Labuaja villagers have not asked that their territory be released from NP Babul's area, but rather that they be given ownership of traditional zones as a win-win solution.

4.2.4. The interests of third-party actors

The Forestry Faculty at Hasanuddin University helped mediate the conflict resolution process by mapping out the area claimed by the Tallasa villagers, and communicating the villagers' interests to NP Babul's management and the Maros District Government. The university's interest is to involve its students in practical conflict negotiation as part of the curriculum. These efforts are not supported by a formal budget; the students are mobilised for academic

purposes only. However, the university's actors have enough social capital, and the other actors involved directly in the conflict trust them.

4.3. Analysing latent and manifest visibility

Table 4 and Fig. 2 illustrate the conflict and its escalation dynamics, based on our novel methodology, as shown in Table 1.

Our findings in Table 4 and Fig. 2 provide information on each actor's historical background and interests during specific time periods (as shown in the last column of Table 4), which easily helped develop the three dimensions of conflict visibility. Based on Table 4, we observed that there are three patterns of conflict visibility: 1-0-0, 1-1-0, 1-0-1 and 1-1-1. This indicates that since the beginning of the conflict, conflict has substantially existed due to the contrasting interests of the government and local community.

Table 4
Description of conflict visibility dynamics by Tallasa villagers versus a description by the staff of NP Babul.

Momentum	Specific event and conditions	Status	Visibility dimension	Time period
Policy without enforcement: There is a low participation rate from non-government actors in terms of designating the state forest area	Villagers are included in the state forest area designated as a production and protection forest	Latent: not visible in public discourse	1–0–0	1982–1998
Hollow state on the management of forest protection and forest production. There is no legal protection for those living in the state forest area	Villagers try to bargain regarding their position.	Latent: not visible in public discourse	1–0–0	1999–2003
Gaining information: New era of democratisation (transition era); people are allowed to openly disapprove of state policy	Villagers protest some areas of their neighbours being excluded from state forest areas, while their areas are still included	Latent: not visible in public discourse	1–1–0	2004
New policy established: In the early stage of NP Babul establishment	The officer from NP Babul does not take any action in the field The consortium (multiple stakeholders, collaborative actors) of NP Babul is established, but there are not enough local representatives; the consortium has no clear function	Latent: not visible in public discourse	1–1b–0	2004–2005
NP Babul established and conservation policy enforcement	Villagers use illegal chainsaws to cut down trees.	Manifest: visible in public discourse	1–1–1	2007
NP Babul enforcement and mass demonstration	- Bringing a person from the village to court for illegal mining - A mass demonstration in the district centre and in front of the district parliament office - NP Babul's management does not approve of developing electric facilities in Tallasa Sub-Village - No action occurs in the field (no dialogue among multiple actors)	Manifest: visible in the media and public discourse		2008 until
NP Babul enforcement and segmented dialogue	Segmented dialogue only for villagers, NP Babul's management and the Maros District Government	Manifest: visible in public discourse	1–1–1	Mid-2010
NP Babul enforcement, dialogue and new policy offered	Multiple actors engage in dialogue, some actors from Tallasa Sub-Village approve of the Special Zone Policy as a temporary solution. For the purposes of the negotiations, the Maros District Government brought new members into the task force, including new mediators from Hasanuddin University and RECOFTC.	Manifest: visible in public discourse	1–1b–1	Mid-2010
NP Babul enforcement and villagers take 'wait and see' approach to the new policy offered	NP Babul informally allowed actors to propose that Tallasa Sub-Village be released from the state forest area, but emphasised that the district government should do so	Latent: not visible in public discourse	1–1?–0	2011

1b = new policy offered.

1? = unknown of future policy development.




Fig. 3. When policies were not enforced, conflict is hidden and multiple local practises were facilitate during period 1982–2003.

Fig. 2 postulates that only three types of conflict visibility occurred in our heuristic case: type I (1-1-1), type II (1-1-0) and type III (1-1-0). This confirms Hypothesis I that types IV, V, VI and VIII could not be identified. It was also found that the conflict between people's livelihood and conservation interests remained the same over the 40-year period, but regulations and visibility changed. Based on the historical description in Table 4 and the explanation in Section 4.2, we found that the national park did not offer a resolution which supported both conflicting interests. Special zone policy, which was offered by (Babul N.P., 2010), only made the conflict invisible (latent), but the basic interests on the ground are still in conflict.

The involvement of third-party actors in 2010–2011 only slightly de-escalated the situation, but has had a good impact on mapping out and considering the interests of all actors (see Section 4.7 for a detailed explanation). During the formal negotiations, non-legal options (i.e. consensus) were chosen as an alternative; yet such a choice is uncertain in the long term. In public discourse, it seems that the villagers have accepted the Special Zone Policy proposed by NP Babul only for the sake of de-escalation. However, the local community remains steadfast in its demand that its territory be released from the state forest area. This also confirms one part of Hypothesis I that the national park did not offer a resolution, but instead supported both conflicting interests.

4.4. When policies are not enforced, the visibility is latent: explaining type 1-0-0 (during 1982–2003)

The conflict was hidden from the public for a very long time because only academic actors and a very limited number of elite (government) actors recognised it. Table 4 and Fig. 2 illustrate how the conflict was hidden from public view from 1982 to 1984. The Maros District Government and other actors tried to prevent the conflict from being settled, and the interests of the villagers were not considered. When the state forest area was first being estab-

lished, there was a 'closed system', meaning that only a certain number of villagers were involved in mediation to fulfil a legal requirement that a minimum number of actors from the public participate. Table 4 and Fig. 3 (below) show that when Tallasa Sub-Village was designated as a production and protection forest (administered by the Maros District Government), the villagers did not recognise the conflict as legitimate. The Maros District Government realised that if it tried to remove the villagers from the state forest area, then other communities with the same problem (i.e. living in a state forest area) would also start conflicts with the government. Thus, it did not enforce the rule that villagers were not allowed to live in the state forest and earn a livelihood using its resources. District governments are facing new circumstances in an era of decentralisation; they have new responsibilities for running state forest areas. They do not have enough officers on staff, and a clear system of forest management is lacking (Sahide et al., 2016b).

The specific situation described in this paper has been influenced by the general circumstances of the forestry sector since the decentralisation era began in 2000. At that time, district governments had a lot of power over state forest areas, especially production and protection forests. However, their legal capacity was limited in terms of the number of staff and the quality of public service. The district governments did not have the power to continue managing forests, and only gave licences to private actors to utilise them. No private actor received a licence to manage production forests in the Tallasa area. In addition, the Maros District Government took no action when villagers built public facilities in state forest areas such as local markets, elementary schools, and public pathways. This also included the use of wood as energy to make traditional palm sugar; this traditional and public use of forest resources is fundamentally against state forest rules. This particular situation arose between 1999 and 2003, during the beginning of the democratisation era, when some village elites informally protested that their livelihood areas should not be included in state forests. However, the conflict still did not expand into public discourse and it remained latent.




Fig. 4. Effective policy constraining multiple local practises since 2007–2010.

4.5. *Ineffective policies enforcement did not change visibility in practice: explaining type 1-1-0*

Fig. 2 and Table 4 show that from 2004 to 2005, the new policy was issued after a hollow state of ineffective forest production and forest protection policies. It established NP Babul in 2004; however, the officer from NP Babul did not take any action in the field, but only began a multi-actor dialogue at the provincial and district levels. To support this multi-actor dialogue, it facilitated a NP Babul consortium; however, there are not enough local representatives and the consortium has no clear function. The conflict is still hidden from public discourse in this new period of NP Babul policy, which proves Hypothesis II that the policy for enforcing existing formal regulations did not change visibility in practice.

4.6. *Effective new policy enforcement forcing manifest visibility: explaining type 1-1-1 (during 2007–2010)*

Fig. 2 also confirms Hypothesis II that policy for enforcing a new formal regulation triggered change in implementation and visibility. Our results show that strong and new policy enforcement makes the conflict visible if national parks do not carry out law enforcement (such as how the Maros District Government did when it was dealing with the production forest), and then disputes remain latent in terms of escalation. Law enforcement actions, as shown in Fig. 4, caused villagers to react and identify their roles and interests in the conflict.

Meanwhile, the local community considered the consequences of living in a state forest area. The purpose of the law enforcement actions was to send a message to the local community and other actors that NP Babul was the new representative state institution in Tallasa's territory, and that it played a major role in conservation.

4.7. *A specific investigation into the role of public discourse and negotiation for the conflict's visibility: explaining type 1-1b-1 and type 1-1?-0 (during 2010–2011)*

Table 4 and Fig. 2 show that the limited legal options have led the actors to try non-legal paths and search for channels of negotiation that strong external actors support (see Fig. 5 for an illustration of the coalition against NP Babul policy). Non-state actors facilitate disputes; this encourages the Tallasa villagers to not expand their land in NP Babul and to stop illegal mining, and encourages NP

Babul to not use law enforcement for a certain period until legal options are utilised. Third-party actors have tried to persuade the Tallasa villagers to accept the Special Zone Policy (a new policy offered means type:1-1b-0). This situation is still in progress and continues to evolve; however, during the short period of mediation in 2010–2011, the third-party actors continued to discuss the technical mechanisms and agreements related to implementing the policy, while letting the Maros District Government take the initiative to legally release Tallasa Sub-Village from NP Babul. Non-state actors face barriers in terms of mediating the conflict due to the state actors and Indonesia's complex legal conservation system. We still do not know the future of policy development, whether the actors received the new special zone policy or are developing other policy resolutions (1-1?-0). Hence, this is in line with Hypothesis II that the development of regulation in the latent period remains open due to the short period of visibility.

Fig. 2 shows that escalation increased in 2007 but fell after 2010. Therefore, it is interesting to see the role of public discourse and conflict mediation in the conflict's visibility. From 2008–2009, there were three areas of public discourse after new NP Babul was enforced: 1) Bringing a person from the village to court for illegal mining; 2) stopping the use of illegal chainsaws to cut down trees; and 3) NP Babul's management did not approve of developing electric facilities in Tallasa Sub-Village. The regional media has also covered the mass demonstration by villagers opposing NP Babul and asking to exclude their livelihood area from the state forest.

Third-party actors facilitated mediation and negotiation in the conflict facing Tallasa Sub-Village. As an international (regional) organisation, RECOFTC mediated the actors' interests in the field, especially from 2009 to 2010, and received support from international donors. This program (which includes the voluntary, unstructured program of Hasanuddin University) helped reduce potential escalation, and defined the interests of all actors.

The clarity of information during negotiation and public discourse tends to make actors reduce their interest (informally accept the special zone policy) due to the awareness of negotiation costs for each option to resolve the conflict (see Table 5). Therefore, this public discourse (e.g. mass demonstration, broadening coalition on conflict mediation discourse) as well as media coverage has a broad impact on the new policy issue establishing the special zone in Tallasa village. Hence, this is in line with Hypothesis III that visibility in political discourse and media has an impact on reformulating formal regulation.




Fig. 5. Mobilising the opposing coalition against NP Babul policy (since 2010).

Table 5
Main Legal options to resolve the conflict and its challenges, as well as the cost of negotiation.

Options	Legal process	Weakness	Level of negotiation cost
Release Tallasa from NP Babul	It should be released from protection forest and then released from NP Babul	Very complicated procedures	Very high cost: Regional government should subsidize the cost; district forests' funds are very limited.
Accept special zone options	All local representatives should agree with the special zone	Limited use and uncertain use of timber cutting licence	Low cost: NP Babul park has a settled budget for this special zone policy

However, media discourse on the dispute has existed since the national park policy was enforced in the field, but when the conflict entered the final negotiation phase, the conflict process stopped being discussed in the media because there was no longer any coverage of it; today, only the elite still talk about it.

4.8. The effectiveness of the methodology

The three dimensions of conflict visibility (see Tables 1 and 2), which are based on the actor-centred framework, have been successfully tested to measure the visibility of conflict dynamics. For example, it is easy to see the substantial dimension by providing a clear definition of land use conflict and applying it to our heuristic case, due to the clear distinction of interests (e.g. between conservation- and production-oriented bureaucracies). However, like most other typology-based methodologies, ours comes with the risk of stalling the three-dimensional approach, causing it to become a static framework that belies the dynamism (Wigell, 2008) of the political visibility of conflict escalation. Fig. 2 presents only a binary classification of this, dividing it into latent and manifest, without providing a detailed dynamic investigation of the spectrum of evolution from latent to manifest. This will be a challenge for future research.

We constructed our explanation by focusing on regulatory power, and developed the categorisation of coercion power in regards to policy formulation and policy enforcement as the strong variable of visibility. This approach results in the empirical possibility of conflict visibility, which could be adapted for other domestic

land use conflicts. With this additional perspective, Figs. 2–5 have successfully and clearly proven all our hypotheses.

5. Conclusion

We have developed a perspective on conflict visibility by building a three-dimensional framework consisting of: 1) defining conflict (the substantial aspect), 2) settling conflict (the regulatory aspect) and 3) visualising conflict (visibility). We observed that conflict becomes substantial when the villagers compete with the state over the use of forest resources. In terms of the regulatory dimension, we developed a framework that examines how coercion is exercised in relation to policy formulation and enforcement. We found that policy enforcement increases the visibility of conflicts in public discourse. With regard to the empirical visibility of conflicts, we used the actor-centred methodology as a framework, which is based on common indicators of bureaucratic politics theory. This methodology can be applied to other cases of land use conflicts. This methodology distinguished VIII types of conflict visibility, which can also contribute to discourse on conflict governance, such as in conflicts involving multiple stakeholders (Hemmati, 2002) as well as after a dispute (Brinkerhoff, 2007). We find that our heuristic case exhibits only conflict visibility types I, II, and II. We find that types IV, V, VI, and VIII could not be observed in our case.

We observed that the park management did not offer final resolution, which supported both conflicting interests. The conflict between peoples' livelihoods and conservation interests was consistent over the 40-year period, but regulations, their enforcement, and conflict visibility changed. Due to bureaucracies'

long-established, conservation-oriented leanings (which underlie socially-oriented tasks), it is difficult to officially expand the interpretation of national parks' formal mandates to say that parks should carry out both conservation operations as well as a social mission. The very weak legal instruments of the social interests of national park policies reflect this. The plural and fragmented interests of the internal Tallasa villagers have not appeared during the mediation process due to the villagers having to face tough opponents, and local key actors internally consolidating to form an opposition group against NP Babul. In addition, key trusted actors who live in Tallasa's vicinity (but not in the sub-village itself) have expressed their concern and are actively involved in the mediation process. The strongest position expressed during the mediation process was that Tallasa's territory should be released from NP Babul.

The Maros District Government has maintained a 'wait and see' attitude (i.e. to see how the situation unfolds) in order to enhance its bargaining power with the national parks. In many cases, the Maros District Government and the national parks depend on each other. For instance, the Maros District Government and NP Babul both manage the Bantimurung Waterfall, a natural tourist attraction. The District Government did not want to lose its benefits in this joint endeavour. It used the excuse of lacking a budget and staff resources to conceal its interests and delay the conflict resolution process. The Maros District Government must build a constructive relationship with NP Babul's management due to its interest in jointly managing the mass tourism site in the Bantimurung conservation area, which has contributed significantly to the district's revenue. Likewise, NP Babul's management should maintain its relationship with the Maros District Government. The purpose is to help NP Babul's management mediate the conflict by letting the Maros District Government take the initiative to transform part of the conservation zone into a more liberal, non-state forest area.

In the latent position, we find that policy for imposing existing formal regulations did not change visibility in practice, or ineffective policies enforcement did not change visibility in practice. Furthermore, conflicts become manifest when a new policy is introduced and comes into force, in this case, state forest areas are declared by creating national parks and policy is effectively enforced. When Tallasa Sub-Village was part of a state forest area with a forest production status (run by the Maros District Government), there was no conflict between villagers and the government regarding forest utilization, because timber use was not prohibited and no law enforcement activities were undertaken on potentially conflictive issues. However, when the status of the state forest area changed to a conservation forest, NP Babul's management started actively carrying out law enforcement actions, and the conflict escalated. Hence, we conclude that the policy of enforcing formal regulations triggered changes in implementation and increased the empirical visibility of conflict. This has far-reaching methodological implications for land use conflict studies, which usually focus on highly visible conflicts only. The study of more latent conflicts at earlier stages, however, bears the opportunity to more thoroughly research into the underlying factors causing conflict. It also enables us to find more effective ways for mediating conflicts which are about to escalate in terms of their empirical visibility.

The park's Special Zone Policy, which (1-1b-1) was a result of public and media discourse along with the mediation process, is reducing tensions and the conflict becomes latent. We can conclude that political discourse and media have an impact on reformulating formal regulation. We also found that due to the short period of visibility, the development of regulation in the latent period remains open (1-17-0). The Special Zone Policy has gaps in terms of concrete implementation, which has led to multiple interpretations of it (Moeliono et al., 2010). In turn, such interpretations are con-

structed by *de facto* land access activities that go beyond formal regulations (this is in line with Galudra et al., 2013).

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